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Two for the Knowledge Goal of Inquiry
Christoph Kelp∗
Abstract
This paper provides two arguments in favour of the thesis that
knowledge, rather than some epistemic standing falling short
of knowledge such as true belief, justified belief or justified true
belief, is the goal of inquiry. First, only the knowledge goal
is compatible with a satisfactory account of when agents are
released from various commitments they may have to reaching
the goal of inquiry. And, second, only the knowledge goal can
make proper sense of progress in inquiry.
1 Introduction
Suppose you ask yourself whether your father’s record collection in-
cludes a certain recording of The Trout and venture to find out. At
that time, you embark on an inquiry into whether your father owns
the relevant recording. Your inquiry is a project with a specific goal:
finding out whether your father owns the recording. This fact about
your inquiry generalises: inquiry is a goal-directed enterprise. A spe-
cific inquiry can be individuated by the question it aims to answer
and by who aims to answer the question. Your inquiry into whether
your father owns the recording differs from your inquiry into how
many records your father owns because different questions are being
asked. Your inquiry into whether your father owns the recording dif-
fers from my inquiry into whether he does because different people
are inquiring.
The goal of inquiry into a given question by an agent, α, can be
characterised, neutrally, as α’s having the answer to that question. I will
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here focus only on inquiries into whether-questions and characterise
the goal of inquiry into whether φ by α as α’s having the answer to
the question whether φ.
At the same time, there are various substantive epistemological
theses concerning the goal of inquiry. These can be understood as
competing accounts of what it takes for an agent to have the answer
to a whether-question. The most prominent candidates include:
K-Goal. α has the answer to the question whether φ at time t if and only
if, at t, α knows whether φ.1
TB-Goal. α has the answer to the question whether φ at time t if and only
if, at t, α truly believes whether φ.2
JB-Goal. α has the answer to the question whether φ at time t if and only
if, at t, α justifiably believes whether φ.3
JTB-Goal. α has the answer to the question whether φ at time t if and only
if, at t, α justifiably and truly believes whether φ.4
In what follows I will provide some evidence favouring K-Goal
over the three competitors just mentioned. In order to achieve this I
will, first, outline a general framework for goal-directed projects and
provide support for a number of crucial theses about such projects
(§2). I will then apply the framework to inquiry projects (§3) and
argue that K-Goal has an edge over its three abovementioned rivals
(§4).
2 Projects
I will start with some basic concepts. Where ψ is any goal-directed
project, Ω its goal, α any agent and t any time:
1 Champions of K-Goal include Timothy Williamson [2000] and Alan Millar [in
2010].
2 TB-Goal has been defended for instance by Jonathan Kvanvig [2003] and
Michael Lynch [2005].
3 Donald Davidson [2005], Richard Rorty [1995, 2000] and Richard Feldman
[2002] are among the most prominent advocates of JB-Goal.
4 I am not sure whether this view actually has any defenders. The view that
justified true belief rather than knowledge is of central epistemic value is often at-
tributed to Mark Kaplan [1985] (e.g. in Pritchard and Turri 2011). Since Kaplan’s
argument against the value of knowledge concerns the role of knowledge in in-
quiry, Kaplan might be sympathetic to this view.
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Accomplishment. ψ is accomplished by α at t if and only if, at t, α has
reached Ω.
For instance, R1 has accomplished his project of running a marathon
if and only if he has run the distance (i.e. 42.195 kilometres).
Completion. ψ is completed for α at t if and only if, at t, α believes that he
has accomplished ψ.
For instance, R1’s project of running a marathon is completed for him
if and only if he believes that he has run the distance.
Ongoingness. ψ is ongoing for α at t if and only if, at t, α is committed to
accomplishing ψ.
For instance, R1’s marathon project is ongoing for him just in case he
is committed to running the distance.
There are a number of types of commitment one may have to-
wards accomplishing an ongoing project. The nature of the commit-
ment depends on how it arises. For instance, R1 may have the desire
to run a marathon and thereupon form the intention to do so. In
this case, I will say that R1 has a practical commitment to running a
marathon. R1 may also have promised someone to run a marathon.
In this case, R1 has a moral commitment to running a marathon. Or
R1 may have been contracted to run a marathon in which case his
commitment will be contractual. Other forms of commitment are con-
ceivable. What’s more, an agent may simultaneously have various
different kinds of commitment towards accomplishing a project. Be-
sides having originally formed an intention to run a marathon out of
a desire to do, R1 may now have promised and signed a contract that
he would do so. In this case, R1 is practically, morally and contractu-
ally committed to running a marathon.
One way in which an agent can be released from any commitment
he has towards accomplishing a certain project is by accomplishing
the project. This gives us a crucial thesis:
Commitment Release. If α has accomplished ψ at t, then, at t, α is released
from all commitments towards accomplishing ψ.
For instance, when R1 has made the distance, he will be released
from his practical, moral and contractual commitments to running a
marathon.
Accomplishing a project is not the only way of being released
from a commitment to its accomplishment. R1 may lose interest and
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as a result drop his intention to run a marathon. This will release
him from his practical commitment. Of course, even when R1 has
lost interest, he may still be bound by his promise or the contract he
entered. In order to be released from the corresponding moral and
contractual commitments, R1 may need the cooperation of, here, the
person he made the promise to and the other party to the contract.5
It may be worth noting that an agent may have accomplished a
given project even when it is not completed for him. Suppose the
officials of a marathon race miscalculate the distance and, as a result,
misplace the finish line at 43 kilometres. R1 will have accomplished
his marathon project 805 metres before the finish line. However,
when he does not know about the mistake, his project remains incom-
plete for him for another 805 metres. While he is running that dis-
tance, R1 will believe that he is still bound by his intention, promise,
contract, etc. and that he still has to run until he has crossed the finish
line.
Often projects admit of varying degrees of progress towards ac-
complishment. Progress here is a function of times and distances
from accomplishment. α has made progress on ψ between ti and tj if
and only if, at tj, α is closer to accomplishing ψ than at ti. When R1 is
about to cross the finish line he has made progress on his marathon
project compared to when he crossed the start line because he is now
closer to accomplishing the project.
It is not hard to see that this definition of progress yields the
following thesis about comparative progress:
Comparative Progress. If, at ti, α and β are equidistant from accom-
plishing ψ and α but not β makes progress towards accomplishing ψ
between ti and tj, then β has not accomplished ψ at tj unless α has.
When R1 and R2 are at a certain time head to head in the race and
R2 pauses while R1 continues to run, R2 can’t have accomplished the
marathon project unless R1 has.
3 Inquiry
The above framework for goal-directed projects can easily be applied
to various projects of inquiry. The project of inquiry into whether φ is
5 In addition, one may have a moral commitment to fulfil other commitments,
such as contractual ones, that one has taken on. In that case, one won’t be released
from one’s moral commitment unless one has been released from one’s contractual
commitment. The same may hold for other types of commitments.
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ongoing for agent α at t if and only if, at t, α is committed to having
the answer to the question whether φ, accomplished at t if and only
if, at t, α has the answer, and completed at t if and only if, at t, α
believes that he has the answer.
I will momentarily develop a couple of problems for competitors
to K-Goal. Before moving on to the relevant arguments, however,
I would like make three preliminary points. The first one concerns
the notion of justified belief at issue in JB-Goal and JTB-Goal. For
the purposes of this paper, I will work with the following popular
characterisation of this notion:
Justified Belief. One’s belief that φ is justified if and only if, given one’s
belief that φ is additionally true and ungettiered, it qualifies as knowl-
edge that φ.
Second, the project of inquiry into whether φ is completed for α
at t if and only if, at t, α believes whether φ. After all, any agent
capable of having a commitment towards accomplishing this project
must have the concept of question and answer as well as the con-
cepts needed to formulate the question whether φ. Any agent so
equipped who believes that φ will also believe that he has the answer
to the question whether φ and any agent so equipped who believes
that not-φ will also believe that he has the answer to the question
whether φ. Moreover any agent who believes that he has the answer
to the question whether φ will also either believe that φ or else believe
that not-φ (but not both). Thus belief whether φ completes inquiry
into whether φ. Since all four competing accounts of the goal of in-
quiry endorse a belief condition on accomplishment of inquiry, for
the purposes of this paper, we get the following thesis:
Completion Requirement. α has accomplished inquiry into whether φ at
t only if, at t, α has completed inquiry into whether φ.6
Third, concerning inquiry, distance from accomplishment super-
venes on epistemic and doxastic position towards the answer as well
as the answer’s truth value and the agent’s practical position. This
gives us:
Duplicates. If α and β are worldmates and share the same epistemic,
doxastic and practical position towards φ, they are equidistant from
accomplishing inquiry into whether φ.
6 If you disagree with the argument for Completion Requirement, I’d like to
invite you to interpret the above passage as spelling out a number of idealisations
under which it can be said to hold.
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No Progress. If α’s epistemic, doxastic and practical position towards φ
does not change between ti and tj, then α makes no progress on his
inquiry into whether φ.
4 Two for K-Goal
4.1 Commitment Release
Now consider the following case:
Detective 1. D1 is a private detective who has been hired for one month to
find out whether someone in X’s office is the murderer of X’s wife,
Y. D1 first investigates suspect S, one of X’s colleagues, who has a
particularly strong motive for the deed. Fortunately for D1, S credi-
bly admits to having committed the crime upon questioning and even
signs a confession in writing. On the basis of this evidence, D1 comes
to believe that someone in X’s office has murdered Y, thereby com-
pleting his inquiry. With the inquiry completed on the first day, D1
packs his bags, including the confession, gets on the next flight to
the Caribbean where he intends to take a holiday for the rest of the
month. Meanwhile, it becomes widely known that S’s claim to have
had murdered Y is false. D1, who is currently sipping cocktails in the
sun is unaware of the news about S’s statement.
Notice that D1’s belief that someone in X’s office did the deed was
formed on the basis of excellent evidence, evidence that is strong
enough to turn an ungettiered true belief into knowledge: S’s strong
motive and credible confession. By Justified Belief, then, D1’s belief
is justified. In addition, we may assume that it is true: someone in
X’s office did indeed murder Y. It is just that it wasn’t S. D1 satisfies
all of TB-Goal, JB-Goal and JTB-Goal. By Commitment Release,
all of the above predict that D1 is released from all commitments
towards finding out whether someone in X’s office murdered Y.
Now here is the sixty-four thousand dollar question: Is this pre-
diction correct? In particular, is D1 released from his contractual com-
mitment to find out whether someone in X’s office murdered Y? The
answer to this question is very plausibly ‘no’. D1 may have an ex-
cellent excuse for not working on the case. At the same time, as far
as his contract is concerned, what D1 ought to be doing is work on
the case rather than sit on the beach in the Caribbean. If this isn’t
immediately obvious, put yourself in the shoes of D1’s employer and
suppose you have found out about D1’s situation. While you might
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concede that D1 has an excuse for no longer working on the case,
you could rightly insist that, as far as the contract is concerned, what
D1 ought to be doing is work on the case rather than sip cocktails
on some beach in the Caribbean. What’s more, you may rightly take
steps to get him back to work, to fulfil his contract. Notice that when
you do this, there is no need to negotiate a new contract with D1.
All you need to do is remind him of the old contract, which is still
binding. None of this would make any sense if D1 had been released
from his contractual commitment.7
Thus, TB-Goal, JB-Goal and JTB-Goal’s prediction that D1 is re-
leased from all commitments towards finding out whether someone
in X’s office murdered Y is mistaken. In contrast, K-Goal does not
make a mistaken prediction here. After all, Detective 1 is a standard
Gettier case and so D1’s belief falls short of knowledge. According
to K-Goal, then, D1 falls short of accomplishing the relevant inquiry
project and is therefore not released from his commitments to its ac-
complishment.
4.2 Progress
Let’s again start with some cases:
Detective 2. D2 is inquiring into whether the murderer of Z works for a
certain company C. D2 first investigates suspect S, an employee at
C, who has a particularly strong motive for the deed. Fortunately
for D2, S credibly admits to having committed the crime upon ques-
tioning and even signs a confession in writing. On the basis of this
information, at t1, D2 comes to believe P = that someone in X’s office
has murdered Z, thereby completing his inquiry. D2 gets on the next
flight to the Caribbean, where he is currently (t2) sipping cocktails in
the sun.
Detective 3. D3 is inquiring into whether the murder of Z works for a
certain company C. D3 first investigates suspect S, an employee of
C, who has a particularly strong motive for the deed. Fortunately
7 Compare also: You have contracted a moving company to move all your fur-
niture from your old address to the new one. So long as the company has moved
only part of your furniture, they have not fulfilled the contract. As far as the con-
tract is concerned, they ought to continue working on moving your furniture rather
than call it an early day, say. You may also rightly take steps to get them back to
work, without first having to negotiate a new contract. This is so even if they have
an excellent excuse for having called it a day, say because they justifiably believe
that they have already moved all your furniture.
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for D3, S credibly admits to having committed the crime upon ques-
tioning and even signs a confession in writing. On the basis of this
information, at t1, D3 comes to believe P = that someone in X’s office
has murdered Z, thereby completing his inquiry. However, at t2, D3
discovers that S’s confession was false. S in fact had a watertight alibi
for the time of the crime and was trying to protect the perpetrator.
Now here is the crucial claim: D3 has made progress on his inquiry
project between t1 and t2. By way of support for this claim notice, first,
that, at t2, D3 has discovered that a certain piece of evidence that, at
t1, appears to support P is misleading. Second, at t2, D3 can tick one
person off the list of suspects he was not not able to tick off at t1.
The problem for all of TB-Goal, JB-Goal and JTB-Goal is that
they are unable to accommodate the crucial claim. Here is why:
1. D3 has made progress on his inquiry into whether P between t1 and
t2. [Crucial claim]
2. At t1, D2 and D3 are in the same epistemic, practical and doxastic
position towards P and they are worldmates. [Premise]
3. At t1, D2 and D3 are equidistant from accomplishing the project. [2,
Duplicates]
4. D2’s epistemic, practical and doxastic position towards the issue re-
mains unchanged between t1 and t2. [Premise]
5. D2 does not make progress on the inquiry project between t1 and t2.
[4, No Progress]
6. At t2, D3 does not have a belief whether P. [Premise]
7. At t2, D3 has not accomplished the project. [6, Completion Require-
ment]
8. D2 has not accomplished the project at t2. [1, 3, 5, 7, Comparative
Progress]
It is easy to see that TB-Goal, JB-Goal and JTB-Goal are all incom-
patible with [8]. After all, D2’s belief in P is again based on excellent
evidence, evidence strong enough to turn an ungettiered true belief
into knowledge: S’s strong motive and credible confession. By Jus-
tified Belief, then, D2’s belief is justified. We may also assume that
his belief is true: Someone working for C did the deed—it’s just that
it wasn’t not S. Thus, according to TB-Goal, JB-Goal and JTB-Goal,
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at t2, D2 has accomplished inquiry into whether P. None of the three
views is compatible the plausible crucial claim.
In contrast, K-Goal once again avoids the problem. Since knowl-
edge requires an anti-Gettier condition and since D2’s belief at t2
is gettiered (as, by the way, are D2 and D3’s beliefs at t1), it does
not qualify as knowledge. For that reason, as opposed to TB-Goal,
JB-Goal and JTB-Goal, K-Goal does not predict that, at t2, D2 has
accomplished the inquiry project. K-Goal is thus compatible with
the crucial claim, that D3 makes progress on the question whether P
between t1 and t2. In fact, to the extent that it is plausible that D3’s
subsequent discoveries and investigations get him closer to knowl-
edge whether P, K-Goal predicts that D3 has made progress on the
project.
5 Conclusion
The main ambition of this paper was to provide support for K-Goal.
In order to achieve this I have provided reason to think that K-Goal
is preferable to its most promising competitors, TB-Goal, JB-Goal
and JTB-Goal on two counts: first, only K-Goal makes the correct
predictions about when agents are released from commitments to
inquiry projects in cases like Detective 1 and, second, only K-Goal is
compatible with a plausible thesis about progress in inquiry in cases
like Detective 2 and 3.8
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